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INTRODUCTION
Piracy and armed robbery against ships is not only
a part of maritime history, it is still present on the seas all
over the world. A study conducted by the IMB noted that
the number of reported piracy attacks worldwide contin-
ued and a total of 297 incidents of piracy and armed rob-
bery against ships were reported in 2012 [1]. The last time
piracy figures crossed 400 incidents was in 2003 and then
in 2009 when the problem escalated and stayed above that
level until 2011 [2, 3]. Blurred by the often unbalanced and
sensationalistic approach by the media, it is difficult to get
a realistic picture of the dangers on board. The mortality
rate for accidents occurring at work on board is 53 per
100,000 seafarer-years, while the suicide rate is 1.3 per
100,000 seafarer-years [4]. Homicide rates are highest for
seafarers in Asia where there is the highest piracy problem.
Taken globally from piracy violence rates, the risk of being
killed on board by pirates as a merchant mariner is 2.05
per 100,000 seafarer-years [5].
Despite numerous diplomatic, military, and other initia-
tives by many governments and governmental agencies,
particularly in the Indian Ocean, and the protective mea-
sures and other actions adopted by ship-owners, ship-man-
agers, and their representatives, ships are regularly attacked
and seafarers and passengers put at risk as they go about
their legitimate business in international waters.
CURRENT STATE OF PIRACY ACTIVITY
AND THEIR MODES OF ACTION
Pirate attacks against vessels in East and West Africa
accounted for the majority of world attacks in 2012. Of the
297 attacks reported to the IMB in 2012, 104 attacks took
place off Somalia on the east coast and in the Gulf of Guin-
ea on the west coast of Africa. The report showed a slight
drop in the total number of recorded incidents of piracy and
armed robbery worldwide, comparing the 297 recorded in-
cidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2012 to 445 in 2010
and 439 in 2011. The falling numbers come after four con-
secutive years of increased piracy and armed robbery world-
wide (239 incidents reported in 2006, 263 in 2007, 293 in
2008, and 406 incidents reported in 2009) [2, 3]. In 2012,
28 vessels were hijacked, 174 vessels boarded, 28 vessels
fired upon, and 67 vessels reported attempted attacks.
A total of 585 crewmembers were taken hostage, 26 kid-
napped, and six killed as a direct result of the incidents [1].
Somali pirates remain the greatest threat and they ac-
count for approximately 25% of all registered attacks. So-
mali pirate attacks are predominantly concentrated within
the cross roads of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
From January to December 2012 the IMB Piracy Reporting
Centre (PRC) received a total of 75 incidents attributed to
Somali pirates. These incidents continue to threaten an ex-
tended geographical region — from the southern part of the
Red Sea in the west to 76° East longitude and beyond in
the east. Incidents in the past have also been reported off
the coast of Oman/Arabian Sea in the north extending south-
ward to 22° South. A total of 250 seafarers were taken hos-
tage, one injured, and two killed. The east and south coast
of Somalia including the Arabian Sea recorded 49 attacks
and further 13 in the southern Red Sea. The first hijacking
by Somali pirates of an anchored vessel from within the ter-
ritorial waters of a foreign State — namely, Oman — were
reported in 2011 [2]. In this period 14 vessels were hijacked.
Vessels attacked included General Cargo, Bulk Carrier, all
types of Tankers, Ro-Ro, Container Carrier, Fishing Vessels,
Sailing Yachts, Dhows, and Tugboats [1]. There was some
speculation that Somali pirates are using their worldwide
Diaspora for networking and tipping off but the opportunis-
tic character of the attacks and a clear lack of evidence is
making this highly improbable. Vessels attacked off Soma-
lia are randomly selected and are not specifically targeted
for any reason other than they are easy to board [6]. Pirates
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simply patrol an area, wait for the target of opportunity, and
attempt to board [7]. Most of the attacks involve the use of
weapons — mainly rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPG-s),
which is a cause of great concern as it poses a serious threat
not only for injury and death of seafarers but also to the
ship, cargo, passengers, and environment.
Conditions currently prevailing in Somalia provided
a fertile breeding ground for the establishment of modern-
day Somali piracy and clearly the present situation is the
consequence of state failure [8]. With the downfall of the
military regime in 1991 Somalia has fallen into chaos and
lawlessness while the law and order as we know it, as
a function of government, ceased to exist [9]. With the lost
of the central state hundreds of thousands of nationals lost
their jobs and the unemployment rate rose over 90% [10].
Somali pirates are integrated into Somali society, and by
the majority of Somalis in the main pirate areas, piracy is
looked upon more as a business opportunity than a crime.
They are organised along clan lines and considered as
“bread makers” for the local community and often seen as
some sort of “Robin hood” figures. Modern Somali piracy
originated decades ago as a defensive tactic by fishermen
against overfishing by developed nations that were taking
advantage of the power vacuum following the demise of the
Barre regime and of any kind of government control of local
waters. Somali fishermen would stop foreign fishing vessels
and demand reparations, which could take the form of new
nets or other equipment. Money was first offered by fishing
boat captains, presumably seeking an easier solution. Very
quickly various clan leaders saw this as an inviting potential
for revenue raising, and so the more aggressive style of pi-
racy started and expanded to the level we are witnessing
today [8]. Of course, the reasons from two decades ago are
lost and today the clear attraction of it is the money and the
possibility to earn 67–157 time more income than is possi-
ble by a legitimate job in Somalia today [11]. Piracy has
become big business and the pirates, originally Somali fish-
ermen no longer able to earn a livelihood from fishing, now
include criminal elements from many nations. Their main
business aim is the ransom only, not to destroy the ship or
harm the crew. A potential link with terrorism, especially in
Somalia where the Al-Shabab organisation is active, could
also become a problem [12]. If pirates start to use the ships
they capture as a means for transporting terrorism, this
would certainly raise the bar to a new level. Fortunately, at
the moment this does not seem to be likely as Islamist
movements finds it difficult to make headway in Somalia,
where the intrusion of all foreigners — even Muslims — is
looked upon with suspicion. Although there have been con-
nections between the Islamists and the pirates, these have
been of a parochial nature, with no inclination on the part
of the Somali pirates to take up the cudgels of Jihad. How-
ever, many experts say there is little hard evidence to sub-
stantiate such a link [13]. At the moment the conditions
prevailing in Somalia do not give any proof that there are
obvious links between the pirates and terrorism, at least for
the time being, but also there is a fact that the link between
piracy and terrorism is possible [14].
In recent years the pirates typically go to sea in long,
narrow, roughly built open boats of 30 to 40 feet in length
with an inboard diesel towing two smaller open fibreglass
boats fitted with high-powered outboards capable of speeds
up to 25 knots. They carry enough fuel on board to achieve
a range exceeding 1,000 miles and can stay at sea for as
much as 30 days. Sometimes a pirate vessel will outrun its
fuel supply and the crew perish from lack of food and water.
If a ship has not been taken by the end of their deployment
the pirates might become desperate and are liable to at-
tack anything including yachts, irrespective of their value,
simply to survive and return to shore [15]. Today in the re-
gion of Somalia and the Indian ocean in a typical pirate at-
tack, small high speed open boats deploy from a mother
ship, often a pirated fishing vessel or dhow. Commonly two
or more of these small high speed open boats are used in
attacks, often approaching from either quarter of the intend-
ed target firing AK47s or RPGs to intimidate the crew. Ships
slower than theirs are usually approached from the stern
side and then aluminium ladders are used to reach the deck.
This is the technique primarily used in the Puntland area
while in Hoboyo (south Somalia) they use grappling hooks
[16]. For faster ships that can outrun them, like cruise ships,
they use a different tactic: one boat is attacking from the
bow side forcing ship to make an evasive manoeuvre that
shortens the trajectory of the attacking boat that comes
from behind and on the other side of the ship, allowing it to
reach the ship and eventually place the ladders and reach
the deck.
Attacks have increased in number and the area affect-
ed has increased as pirate tactics have evolved. Until 2012,
year on year the numbers of attacks were up some 90%
from 2010 to 2011. However, as deterrence and defensive
measures on merchant shipping improve, the success rate
has reduced to about 1 in 5, particularly in the Gulf of Aden
[15]. This has caused the pirates to adapt their methods of
operation and to range widely over the Somali Basin and far
into the Indian Ocean, reaching as far south as the north-
ern end of the Mozambique Channel. Activity has also been
reported in the southern end of the Red Sea/Bab Al Man-
deb area. Until relatively recently, piracy was restricted by
the monsoon seasons, which made it difficult for them to
operate from small skiffs in heavy weather. Pirates operate
from very small craft, which limits their operation to moder-
ate weather conditions [17]. Now, however, they have adapt-
ed and learnt that by using mother ships and operating in
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well-organised groups (Pirate Action Groups or PAGs), they
are able to operate over greater ranges, for longer periods,
and through the NE monsoon, which is traditionally a favour-
able time for yachts making passage. This year attacks are
continuing during the SW monsoon as well. Somewhat iro-
nically the use of mother ships was something the pirates
learned following naval attempts to “blockade” the Somali
coast to stop them leaving the shore. Mother ships range
from 300,000-ton super tankers to minor merchant vessels
that have been pirated, but are more usually something
smaller such as the Dhow which is traditional to the area
and which might easily blend into fishing fleets. Just before
Christmas 2010 a group of pirates seized a sailing yacht off
the Seychelles and used that as a mother ship, which pro-
vided them the perfect cover to lure ships alongside who
believed they were offering assistance to a distressed ves-
sel [15]. The PAGs do not need to be able to operate the
mother ships they pirate; they use the vessel’s crew to do
that often treating them with extreme violence and keeping
them in harsh conditions. Under the current rules of engage-
ment governing action by the military, life cannot be put at
risk. As a result, the pirates, who are now no more than
organised criminal gangs, have learned the value of using
captive crews as hostages. If a Naval warship draws close,
the pirates simply point a gun at the head of a hostage and
threaten to pull the trigger if the naval ship does not pull
away. The naval forces have no choice but to comply. Inter-
estingly, in the period of relative stability in Somalia, when
the western countries tried to strengthen capacities of their
Coast Guard, some of today’s pirates were actually trained
by western contractors. Pirates in Somalia are now well
equipped with satellite phones and GPS which are easily
accessible on the market today and they often show a lot of
seamanship.
Piracy is a global phenomenon and other seas are af-
fected too. Although only 10 attacks in 2011 and 27 in 2012
were reported in Nigeria, due to underreporting it continues
to be a piracy hotspot. The IMB states that they are aware of
at least another 34 unreported incidents 2011 in Nigerian
waters [2]. Pirates attacked, hijacked, and robbed vessels
including kidnapping crews along the coast, rivers, anchor-
ages, ports, and surrounding waters. While until a few years
ago pirates in the Gulf of Guinea were attacking from a shore
basis, recently they have started to use similar tactics with
the use of mother vessels and to launch their attacks far
from shore. Attacks have been reported up to 120 NM from
the coast. In some incidents, pirates hijacked the vessels
for several days, ransacked them and stealing part of the
cargo, usually gas or oil [7]. It seems that the majority of oil
companies operating in those waters prefer to settle the
ransom discretely. Also, in 2011 a probable extension of
Nigerian piracy into neighbouring Benin included 20 inci-
dents against tankers, eight of which were hijacked and had
cargoes partly stolen. These attacks can be very dangerous
and generally more violence is used in those waters, often
resulting in injuries and deaths. In some incidents, pirates/
/robbers have fired at ships. Many tankers have been
attacked and hijacked, pirates/robbers forced Masters to
sail to unknown locations where the ships’ property and
sometimes cargo has been stolen (gas, oil). In Togo: Lome
— Attacks are increasing. Pirates in the area are well armed,
violent, and dangerous. Attacks can occur at anchorages
and off the coast, usually at night. Some attacks resulted in
the vessel being hijacked for several days during which the
vessel was ransacked and part of the cargo stolen (gas, oil).
In Egypt attacks have been reported at anchorages in Suez
and El Dekheila [7]. In South East Asia and the Indian Sub-
continent, Indonesia has seen a rise in armed robbery for
the second consecutive year. The incidents continue to be
local and opportunistic, according to the IMB, and usually
against anchored vessels. Pirates/robbers are normally
armed with knives and/or machetes. Guns have also been
reported on occasion. Pirates/robbers normally attack ves-
sels during the night. When spotted and an alarm sounded,
pirates/robbers usually abort the attack and move away.
The 73 incidents were reported — up from 46 in 2011 — includ-
ed 71 vessels boarded, and 47 crewmembers taken hos-
tages. Attacks in the South China Sea fell from 13 in 2011
to two in 2012 [1]. Unfortunately the IMB report also noted
the rise of piracy attacks in, until recently, the well-controlled
Singapore Straits (11 attacks in 2011 and six in 2012).
Thanks to the joint efforts of littoral states the once notori-
ous Singapore Straits were until recently well-controlled and
safe waters, but in 2011 a rise in the number of attacks
was noted [2]. Pirates and robbers attack ships while un-
derway or while anchored in the Straits. The Singapore
Straits are one of the most important sea passages in inter-
national shipping connecting the Far East and Indian Ocean.
Pirates are active in South America too, where 16 attacks
were reported (in Haiti, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador and Peru) [1, 7].
Piracy and armed robbery at sea are not only limited to
the open sea and international waters; some ports under
national jurisdiction are subject to attacks on ships being
in their berth or approaching anchorage. Ports like Chi-
tagonng (Bangladesh), with 11 attacks in 2012, gained
the reputation as the most dangerous places for ships,
while in 2012 new notorious hotspots appeared on the
map — the port of Belawan in Indonesia took the lead with
14 attacks. Ports in other regions of the world like Lome,
Abidjan, and Lagos had more than three reported incidents
in 2012 [1].
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HOSTAGE PROBLEM
From time immemorial hostages have been captured
and used as bargaining chips to achieve criminal, military,
political, and religious ends. But no matter what the parti-
cular ideological, motivational, and/or organisational base,
the intention of the captors was not to harm their hostages
so much as to use them as bargaining tools without provok-
ing a retaliatory backlash [15]. With the escalation of piracy
in Africa, the pirates’ aim has become to get the ransom by
holding the ship and/or hostages on board. In 2011 Somali
pirates held 1,206 people hostage. This number represen-
ted 561 people captured in 2011 and 645 people who were
taken captive in 2010 and remained in pirate hands for some
or all of 2011. There are 26 hostages that have been held
for more than two years and 123 hostages that have been
held for more than one year as of 31 May 2012. As of 31st
December 2012 Somali pirates held 127 hostages [1]. The
average period of time in captivity off Nigeria and Benin
tends to be about ten days as compared to the average of
eight months for Somali hijackings, which is 50% more than
the 2010 average [1]. The risk of being subjected to vio-
lence and mistreatment increases with prolonged periods
of captivity, including increased rates of assault and abuse,
increased risk of disease and malnutrition, greater likeli-
hood of giving up hope (for example, a hostage committed
suicide in 2010 during a prolonged captivity), and being
transferred from gang to gang [18]. The extent of the specif-
ic crimes committed during the period of captivity is diffi-
cult to quantify due to the limited amount of publicly avail-
able information. According to publicly available reports, 57%
of hostages faced mistreatment at the hands of pirates. Also,
26% of hostages suffered abuse while 43% were used as
human shields. According to the The Human Cost of Somali
Piracy 2011, published last year, 3,863 seafarers were as-
saulted by pirates during the initial stages of an attack by
firing weapons including assault rifles and RPGs. A total of
968 seafarers came in close contact with armed pirates
aboard their vessels, and 413 (44%) of those were rescued
from citadels by naval forces after waiting for hours (and in
some cases days), often as pirates fought to breach the safe
room. In total 35 hostages died in 2011: eight were killed
by pirates during the attack or after being taken captive,
eight died from disease or malnutrition caused by lack of
access to adequate food, water, and medical aid, and
19 died during rescue efforts by naval vessels or whilst attempt-
ing to escape, the majority of which were being used as
human shields by the pirates [18]. It is likely that these fig-
ures underestimate the total number of pirate causalities
because they do not include those lost at sea or killed dur-
ing encounters with private security. This excludes many of
those killed by other pirates in other piracy-infested waters
like the Gulf of Guinea where the attacks are considerably
more violent.
According to the reports of released hostages, those held
by Somali pirates are subjected to a range of violent crimes.
In addition to the risks associated with the initial assault,
all hostages faced the risk of violence day upon day and
a range of inhumane treatment in violation of their basic
human rights. The reports indicate that the living, hygiene,
and sanitary conditions onboard the hijacked ships declined
rapidly and remained deplorable throughout captivity. All
crews were subject to restricted freedom of movement and
privacy in addition to living under constant threat of physi-
cal and psychological abuse. At least three seafarers from
the 23 reporting vessels died after release as a direct re-
sult of their treatment during captivity. The main triggers of
physical and psychological abuse appeared to be: pirates’
basic ignorance in the workings of a ship, a break down or
slow progress in negotiations, disagreements among the
hostages, and better treatment to some crews in exchange
for information on the others. Half of all hostages in 2011
were subject to moderate abuse by captors including punch-
ing, slapping, or pushing hostages; 10% of hostages suf-
fered severe abuse which included being tied up in the sun
for hours, being locked in a freezer, or having fingernails
pulled out with pliers [18]. The report does not take into
account the stress, fears, and the day-to-day deterioration
in standards of living of the family members of the captive
crews. Pirates inflict psychological abuse along with physi-
cal mistreatment as they seek to terrorise the hostages, their
families, and the ship owners in order to speed up the ran-
som negotiations. They may also do it to break down soli-
darity between crewmembers. This abuse can be quite se-
vere, including threats of execution or acting out mock exe-
cutions, attempts to divide the crew along existing lines of
division, and repeated claims that the hostages have been
abandoned and will never go home.
Due to the global character of the business and interna-
tional crews on board, studies on seamen being held in
hostage situations are very rare. In a study on a Norwegian
crew being held hostage in Libya in 1984 for 67 days and
subjected to psychological and physical torture, the imme-
diate reactions to the extreme stress were fear, depression,
and rage. Within the first few days of imprisonment one sea-
man had been murdered, another had been abducted and
was believed to be dead, and a third had been severely physi-
cally maltreated. Shortly after their release, all the seamen
underwent thorough medical examinations. Six of them
suffered from clear-cut post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and one more seaman developed the disorder two months
later. In spite of comprehensive treatment, the same seven
sailors, or 54% of the crew, still suffered from post-trauma-
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tic stress disorder six months after their release [19]. To
measure the impact of such events, recently a short study
was presented at the International Symposium on Maritime
Health in Odessa. It was conducted on the health conse-
quences among 105 seafarers from four ships that were
victims of a piracy attack and held captive for between three
to nine months. Thorough medical examination including
psychological assessment was conducted on the victims.
The results show that most victims had a health conse-
quence from the attack and that they were either new con-
ditions or exacerbation of existing ones. The occurrence and
severity of new/exacerbated conditions was directly related
to the duration of trauma. Most health consequences were
musculoskeletal (27%) or psychological (depression 15%, se-
condary insomnia 15%, mixed anxiety depression 5%, obses-
sive compulsory disorder 4%, PTSD 1%, headaches 2%). All
related to existing conditions and attack duration. As the diag-
nostic tools and criteria in that study were not stated, there is
a possibility that some of the psychological or even musculo-
skeletal reactions are actually part of PTSD syndrome [11].
Nearly all hostages are, in some form, affected psycho-
logically. While many are able to cope after they were re-
leased, some need more help [18]. The full psychological
impact of such events may only be fully realised after a hos-
tage has reached home or through the passage of time.
Events during the pre-crisis period before an incident can
directly influence reactions experienced by those involved
during the incident and in the immediate aftermath [20].
The impacts of pirates’ abuse does not necessarily end upon
hostages’ release, but can cause varying degrees of long-
-term distress. While there is no significant body of research
that tracks the impact of piracy on seafarers, existing re-
search on violent crime strongly suggests that some of the
people exposed to piracy will have lasting problems [18].
Psychologically, hostage situations raise a number of ge-
neral matters, and an abundance of descriptive reports have
been written about hostages [21–25]. The least affected
are both the aggressive criminal psychopaths and their po-
lar opposites — the extraordinarily mature [26]. This raises
a very interesting question to be researched: are the seafar-
ers more resilient, as some studies show that they enter
into their occupation with more risk markers, like contact
with drugs, police, alcohol, and unprotected sex, than the
workers in other occupations [27].
CURRENT STATE OF ANTI-PIRACY ACTIVITIES
Several organisations have developed best practice
guidelines for defending ships from piracy, and the majority
of big shipping companies either use those or develop their
own using those as a model. In the cruise industry, already
known for strict security measures, all companies have de-
veloped antipiracy procedures and some are employing
armed guards (Privately Contracted Armed Security Person-
nel — PCASP). Even the International Sailing Federation reg-
ularly updates its guidelines for yachtsman sailing in dan-
gerous waters.
On 1 February 2009, the Maritime Security Centre —
Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) (www.mschoa.org) established the
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) [7]. The
IRTC has two lanes, each 5 NM wide and a separation zone
between them 2 NM wide. To all intents and purposes it
operates as a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) although for-
mally it does not have that status. The MSCHOA liaises with
anti-piracy patrols being conducted by warships from sever-
al nations in the area, and the patrols operate mainly in the
Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin but may operate any-
where within the area and provide surveillance and support
as far as possible. The UKMTO (UK Maritime Trade Organi-
sation) in Dubai is principally for the protection of merchant
vessels while US-flagged vessels may wish to contact the
MARLO (Maritime Liaison Office) (USN) Bahrain, who will
provide a similar service [17]. Ships/owners are advised
to register their details on the MSCHOA website
1iv\v\v.msdlOa.org and obtain further information regard-
ing the close support protection details for ships transiting
the Gulf of Aden. Ships are encouraged to conduct their
passage through the IRTC in groups based on their transit
speed of 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 knots [7]. As in that region
pirates are less likely to launch attacks in the dark, ships try
to pass through the IRTC during the hours of darkness. Ba-
sically the same rules apply for tourist sailing; however, no
guarantee whatever can be offered as to the safe transit of
any yacht through these waters. A yacht which, despite the
risks, decides to make a passage should inform the UKMTO
Dubai and MSCHOA of its plans with as much notice as pos-
sible and provide information on its movements preferably
by email but alternatively by telephone. When a yacht regis-
ters, the MSCHOA will email piracy alerts until it is clear of
the area. MSCHOA will pass details of yachts to patrolling
warships. During its passage a yacht should monitor VHF
16 and VHF 8 and report by the means and at the intervals
advised by the MSCHOA, or by a patrolling warship. The yacht
should plan to conduct as much of this part of the passage
as possible at night. If the convoy approach (several yachts
sailing together) is to be followed it is suggested that there is
a limit of no more than five vessels in any one convoy. This is
because vessels will need to keep close to one another if
they are to offer any protection through numbers, and close
station-keeping for the duration of the voyage through the
GoA may prove a strain, particularly if short-handed [17]. There
is only one advantage for the yachts, which is turned into
a disadvantage if spotted. Even during the day, the pirates’
visual horizon is less than five miles; they will see a merchant
ship long before they see a yacht, but that also means that
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when they spot it, the time between first sighting a pirate and
the commencement of an attack could be as little as five
minutes [17]. However, VHF contact is not guaranteed. If
a vessel is out of range of a warship then it is almost certain
that it will not be able to respond to an attack before the
pirates are on board, and there is the view that pirates loiter
near the IRTC waiting for potential victims to pass.
Seafarers on merchant ships activate their Emergency
Communication Plan according to the procedure set up by
their company. If they do not have such a plan they usually
inform the company, the IMB, or, in the zone of Somali pi-
rates, the MARLO or UKMTO. All cruse companies have their
procedures well prepared in advance and passengers are
briefed before entering the dangerous zone. In the majority
of cases if pirates are unable to board within 30–45 minu-
tes they will give up, so standard procedure for all ships is
to increase the ship’s speed to over 15 knots and start eva-
sive manoeuvres. Further procedure depends on the follow-
ing: does the ship have armed guards on board and the
terms of their engagement? If pirates come close to the ship
and try to set grappling hooks or ladders, fire pumps can be
used, and if that defence fails the crew can muster in the
“citadel” (part of the ship where they can securely lock them-
selves, usually the engine room) and wait for rescue. On
cruise ships passengers are instructed to move away from
the windows and decks and stay in designated places in-
side the ship. It is obvious that yachtsmen have no such
possibilities and practically none of those measures except
sending an emergency call can be done. In the Somali re-
gion one should make a mayday call report immediately to
UKMTO Dubai. If possible, the call to UKMTO Dubai should
be followed by a call to the MSCHOA, and MARLO Bahrain
(which focuses on US-flagged vessels) [15].
DISCUSSION
Despite numerous diplomatic, military, and other initia-
tives by many governments and governmental agencies,
particularly in the Indian Ocean, and the protective mea-
sures and other actions adopted by ship-owners, and ship-
managers and their representatives, ships are still regular-
ly attacked. Attacks by Somali pirates have decreased and
successful hijackings have reduced due to the efforts and
actions of the naval forces and preventive measures used
by the merchant vessels. Coalition naval forces, the EU na-
val force (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA), MSCHOA, US Navy, French
Alindien, NATO, UKMTO, Indian Navy, Iranian Navy, Malay-
sian Navy, Russian Navy, Chinese Navy, South Korean Navy,
Japanese Maritime SDF, Singapore Navy, Royal Thai Navy,
and Yemeni Coast Guard are active in the region securing
the passage of ships trough this globally important stretch
of water. In the last quarter of 2011 alone, the navies have
disrupted at least 20 PAGs before they become a threat to
commercial fleets [1]. These pre-emptive naval strikes along
with the combined efforts of the Masters and crews in hard-
ening their vessels on the lines of the Best Management
Practices and the deterrent effect of PCASP-s have contri-
buted to this decrease that continued in 2012 [1]. The role
of the navies is critical to the anti-piracy efforts in this area,
while in other parts of the world the success of the fight
depends mainly on governments successfully cooperating
and controlling their waters.
The number of successful attacks and number of hos-
tages taken has decreased from 1,181 crewmembers in
2010 to 802 in 2011 with 45 vessels hijacked to 585 in
2012 and 28 vessels taken. A total of six crewmembers
were killed througout the 2012 [1]; eight in 2011 the same
number as in 2010 (Fig. 1).
Somali pirates remain the greatest threat and they ac-
count for approximately 25% of attacks, and the number of
their successful hijackings has decreased from 28 to 14.
This improvement is no doubt the result of the continued
efforts of international naval forces and the increased pres-
ence of armed guards on board (PCCCC). The fact is that
none of the ships equipped with armed guards has been
hijacked. Today, there is growing acceptance of their use
because they have successfully defeated hijacking attempts.
Private armed security teams are reported to have prevented
81 (43%) of the 189 attempted hijackings in which pirates
fired upon vessels in 2011 [18]. Legally backed by IMO reso-
lutions 1405, 1406, and 1408, several countries such as
Great Britain and Croatia allow armed guards on board while
others like Denmark strictly prohibit it. The problem is that
further analysis shows that a military presence and PPPPC
on board do not have any deterring effect and that the num-
ber of attacks was on the rise (Fig. 2). The overall number of
Somali incidents actually increased from 219 in 2010 to
237 in 2011 but significantly dropped to 75 in 2012 [1].
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Figure 1. Violence in piracy attacks 2005–2011
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At the same time disproportionate increases have been
observed in other parts of the world. In the Gulf of Guinea
there were 32 incidents — including five hijackings — re-
ported in 2012 compared to 25 in 2011. Unacceptable lev-
els of violence have been used against crewmembers. Guns
were reported in at least 20 of the 32 incidents. At least
one crewmember was killed and another died as a result of
an attack [7]. Although the number of hostages taken in
2011 and 2012 decreased, the violence faced by seafar-
ers, both those unfortunate enough to be captured and the
thousands of seafarers who transit through the High Risk
Areas continues to grow. More aggressive counter-piracy
efforts from private security and naval forces have increased
the level of violence faced by pirate gangs. It is estimated
that 111 pirates were killed in 2011, based on data from
open media sources: 78 died in direct encounters with na-
val forces, three died in clashes with Puntland security forc-
es, and 30 died in fights with other pirates over ransoms
and hostages [18]. The estimates indicate greater rates of
extreme abuse than reported because of there are many
local dhows and fishing vessels that are captured and used
as mother ships that go unreported because they do not
notify the official piracy reporting centres of these attacks
and the crews of these vessels may be injured or killed in
the initial attack or in encounters with navies and armed
guards, but there is no evidence of these occurrences aside
from the occasional news story to show the full extent of
these unverified incidents.
Away from the limelight of statistics, two Italian security
guards who shot dead two innocent Indian fishermen in
a case of mistaken identity have been charged with murder
in India. The problem is that perfectly legitimate tuna fish-
ermen often employ similar tactics as pirates when chasing
fish and it can be very hard to differentiate between a ge-
nuine fisherman and a prospective pirate [17]. It is clear
that the regulation and vetting of the PCASP still needs to
be adequately addressed and that procedures regarding en-
gagement must come under scrutiny.
From the very beginning of proposing PCRDE on board
in 2010, there have been many organisations that have
opposed the use of armed guards because of the risk that
they would increase the degree of violence, and that con-
cern appears to prove true in some ways. Publicly available
reports on pirate engagements with security personnel sug-
gest that pirates do not automatically retreat when they are
fired upon, but instead are engaging armed guards in fire
fights that put the crews at greater risk of being shot [18].
The willingness of pirates to accept these risks shows ei-
ther their ignorance of the dangers associated with piracy,
or the level of their desire to capture a vessel and negotiate
a ransom, and the pirates’ acceptance of these risks ap-
pears to correlate with an increased acceptance of violence
inflicted on their hostages to acquire payment. They are also
adapting their tactics and are now using greater firepower
in their attacks, especially when they encounter vessels
carrying private armed security (Fig. 3).
Due to the pirates’ heightened insecurity they prefer to
keep hostages aboard anchored vessels where they find it
easier to prevent rescue attempts. When circumstances
require them to keep hostages on land, they are more likely
to move them from place to place and separate them in
groups to avoid rescue attempts, especially after US Navy
SEALs rescued two aid workers from the Danish Demining
Group in January 2012. A disconcerting trend has seen cer-
tain hostages separated from their vessels and taken
ashore, or denied freedom when a ransom is paid because
of their nationality. The dangers for the “High-Risk Hostag-
es” are most concerning, both because of the violence they
face and the uncertainty over when, or if ever, they will be
released [18]. Also the average length of captivity for hos-
tages held in 2011 was eight months, 50% more than in
2010. The risk of being subjected to violent crime and mis-
treatment increases with prolonged periods of captivity, in-
cluding increased rates of assault and abuse, increased risk
of disease and malnutrition, greater likelihood of giving up
hope (a hostage committed suicide in 2010 during pro-
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longed captivity), and being transferred from gang to gang.
With the support of the Somali Transitional Government, in
May, EU forces launched an air strike on a pirate base in
Somalia. The attack destroyed pirate equipment and skiffs
on the beach. It is likely that there will be more strikes in the
future. The risk has also expanded to affect tourists and
humanitarian aid workers who have become victims of So-
mali pirate gangs. Additionally, growing violence between
pirate gangs has adverse effects both on hostages and on
Somali civilians.
One of the significant changes in 2011 was the increased
number of hostage deaths. Deaths were assessed using
EU NAVFOR, Compass Risk Management, and open media
sources. Of the 1,206 hostages, 35 (3%) are reported to
have died in 2011. There were many causes of death, in-
cluding being killed by pirates either in the initial attack or
after being taken captive, disease or malnutrition, failed
escape attempts, or getting caught in crossfire during a res-
cue effort by a naval vessel. In cases where seafarers were
killed during rescue attempts, they were being used as hu-
man shields by pirates [18].
CONCLUSIONS
Recent data from the IMB indicate continuing piracy
activity despite the army presence in the Somali region and
the increased presence of armed guards on board. While
the number of successful attacks is on the decline the num-
ber of deaths and injuries has not declined significantly and
attacks are becoming more violent. Such a change in the
character of the attacks could also be attributed to the pre-
sence of the armed guards on board and pirates appropri-
ately changing their tactics, using higher levels of violence
to achieve their goals. Although piracy can be devastating
for ship owners and particularly the crews, it is still a rea-
sonably localised issue not affecting a large group of lei-
sure travellers. Successful hijackings have reduced due to
the efforts and actions of the naval forces and preventive
measures used by the merchant vessels including the use
of citadels and the employment of PCASP. Unfortunately,
the level of violence is rising and we can expect higher le-
vels of violence from both sides [2]. The Somali Transitional
Federal Government had called upon the international com-
munity to provide arms for their Marine Force. The Presi-
dent, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, said „These pirates do
not live at sea; they live in Somalia. Who better to battle
them than the people of the land? We are completely ready
to combat this problem. Despite our limited funds, we are
ready to train and set up a marine force that would attack
and dispel all pirate activities”. No matter how significant
the military presence, the affected waters consist of 2.6 mil-
lion square miles of sea (an area greater than the size of
Europe) and there are only 30 warships available at any one
time; some of these are unavoidably in port and some are
escorting world food aid programme shipping; all of which
reduces resources for further patrolling the area. This means
that in the reality of increased violence, protection is only
partial and only a few countries allow PCSPs on board, and
not all companies can afford such expensive protection. Pira-
cy can only be reduced by state control and political stabili-
ty. Somalia is a failed state and the naval force is merely tack-
ling the symptoms of the problem. The victims also lack ade-
quate protection under the law because, in addition to the
lack of effective policing (or government) in Somalia and in
some other countries, offshore authority is fragmented, there
is no lead law enforcement agency designated to protect sea-
farers and other victims of piracy, and it is also unclear who
should prosecute pirates following apprehension.
A solution to the root cause that spawns piracy will re-
quire political intervention if it is to be resolved; yet there
appears to be no international appetite for this. Piracy re-
mains a profitable enterprise so long as there are no seri-
ous sanctions against it, with millions of dollars exchanging
hands without much publicity or fanfare.
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